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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Based on Defendants' arguments to this Court, Red Bridge contends, as set forth

~

herein, that this appeal is does not present a justiciable question and should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Carlton v. Brown, 2014 UT 6, ,I 30, 323 P.3d 571. If
the Court disagrees, Red Bridge agrees with Defendants that the Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)G).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Issue 1:

Did the district court correctly deny Defendants' motion for

satisfaction of the parties' stipulated judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B?
Standard of Review:

Red Bridge has not located any Utah case law on this

specific question, but case law from other jurisdictions suggests that whether the district
court correctly denies a motion for entry of satisfaction of judgment should be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Gaunt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
24 S.W.3d 130, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (denial of a motion for entry of satisfaction of
judgment should be affirmed "unless there is no substantial evidence to support" the
district court's order, the order is "against the weight of the evidence, or [it] erroneously
declare[s] or appl[ies] the law"); Meyer v. First Am. Title Ins. Agency of Mohave, Inc.,
674 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) ("Consequently, a reviewing court should only
interfere with a trial court's decision on whether a release or satisfaction of judgment has
been properly proved where it is shown that the trial court abused its discretion.").

1
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Preservation for Appeal:

(R. 1357-67, 1504-15; see also Tr. 35:15-36:6, Defs'

Add. 257-58 1.)
Issue 2:

Did the district court err in awarding Red Bridge its attorneys' fees

incurred in collecting and enforcing the stipulated judgment?
Standard of Review:

Red Bridge agrees with Defendants (Defs' Br. at 5) that

"[w]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law," which
~

decision is "review[ed] for correctness," although the "calculation of reasonable attorney
fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the absence
of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, ,r 23, 186
P.3d 989 (quotations and alterations omitted); see also Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ,r
16, 30 P.3d 436 ("The standard of review on appeal of [the amount of] a trial court's
award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of discretion." (alteration in original;
quotation omitted)).
Preservation for Appeal:

(R. 2256-2301, 2380-91.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 2013, the parties executed a settlement agreement pursuant to which they
submitted, and the district court entered, a stipulated final judgment.

After

defendants/appellants Dos Lagos, LLC, Mellon Valley, LLC, Roland N. Walker, and
-iiJ

Sally Walker (collectively, "Defendants") failed to pay the judgment amount, plus
interest, or to perform the conditions necessary to obligate Red Bridge to release the

1

Citations to the Addendum submitted by Defendants/Appellants are indicated by the
reference "Defs' Add."
2

judgment, Red Bridge began efforts to collect the judgment. Defendants opposed Red
Bridge's collection efforts and filed a motion for satisfaction of judgment, seeking to
have the district court declare the judgment satisfied.

The district court denied

Defendants' motion and subsequently granted Red Bridge's motion for an award of its
attorneys' fees.

Defendants have never appealed from or sought to set aside the

stipulated judgment, which required payment of $2,000,000 plus interest accruing at 15%
per annum. Defendants now appeal the district court's refusal to declare the stipulated
judgment satisfied and the court's subsequent award of fees to Red Bridge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Red Bridge Loans $5,072,000 to Defendants.

On July 27, 2007, Defendants Dos Lagos, LLC and Mellon Valley, LLC borrowed
$2,250,000 from Red Bridge (the "Loan"). (R. 2184.) In relevant part, the Loan was
secured by a Deed of Trust, dated July 27, 2007, that was recorded on July 27, 2007, as
Entry No. 20070038205 in the official records of Washington County against two parcels

G.;,

of property, containing approximately 15 acres each (collectively, the "Properties.") (R.
2184.) The Properties are each separated by certain strip parcels (the "Strip Parcels") that
are parallel to Sand Hollow Road, which bisects the Strip Parcels. (R. 808, 817-22; see
also Defs' Add. 002, 11-16.)
Through loan modifications, the principal amount of the Loan was incr~ased from

'-'

$2,250,000 to $5,072,000. (R. 2184.) Defendants defaulted on the Loan and Red Bridge
acquired the Properties by a credit bid at a trust deed sale that occurred on May 4, 2011,

{'.''i

Y;I
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and by a Trustee's Deed that was recorded on May 5, 2011, as Entry No. 20110014096 in
the official records of Washington County, Utah. (R. 2184-85.)

B.

Red Bridge Files a Deficiency Action.

On April 27, 2012, Red Bridge filed a deficiency action under Utah Code Ann. §
57-1-32 against Defendants. (R. 1-23, 2185.) Red Bridge alleged that the outstanding
deficiency owed by Defendants on the Loan, as of April 1, 2012, was $8,562,457.38. (R.
8.) The deficiency action was contested by Defendants. (R. 24-30, 2185.)

C.

Parties Enter into Settlement Agreement and Agree to Entry of
Stipulated Judgment.

Shortly before the deficiency action was scheduled to go to trial, the parties
entered into a Settlement Agreement dated May 15, 2013 (the "Settlement Agreement").
(R. 739, 808-52, 2185; see also Defs' Add. 001-44.) Upon execution of the Settlement
Agreement, Defendants were required to remit $150,000 to Red Bridge, which payment
was made and received.
..JJ

(R. 809, 2185.)

In addition, pursuant to the Settlement

Agreement, a Stipulated Final Judgment Against Defendants was entered by the district
court on May 23, 2013 (the "Judgment").

(R. 745-47.)

The Judgment required

Defendants to pay $2,000,000, together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum. (Id.)
The Judgment further provided that it could be "augmented by the reasonable costs,
expenses and attorneys' fees, incurred by Red Bridge in collecting or enforcing th[ e]
Judgment, with the same being established pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 73."
(R. 746.)

4
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Under the Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge agreed to forebear from executing or
collecting on the Judgment and to deem the Judgment satisfied if Defendants successfully
performed a number of conditions within 180 days after entry of the Judgment. (R. 80811.) Specifically, Defendants were required to perform "all of the following" conditions
within 180 days after entry of the Judgment (or by November 19, 2013):
1.

Defendants would terminate a communications easement that encumbered
the Properties;

2.

Defendants would deliver four unencumbered easements for access and
utilities burdening the Strip Parcels, with the actual locations of the

G,,

easements to be determined by Red Bridge at a future date2 and Defendants
would cause all liens and encumbrances to be removed from the Strip
Parcels; and
3.

The parties would negotiate in good faith a mutually satisfactory
development agreement regarding the Properties and the Strip Parcels, but

~

if such agreement could not be entered into within 180 days, Defendant
Mellon would transfer title to the Strip Parcels to Red Bridge, free and clear
of any and all liens and encumbrances.
(R. 808-10.)

In the Settlement Agreement, Defendants "represent[ed] and warrant[ ed] to Red
Bridge" that the legal descriptions of the Strip Parcels attached as Exhibit B to the
Settlement "constitute[d] all of the property [Defendant] Mellon own[ ed] between the
Properties and Sand Hollow Road." (R. 808.)
2

5
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Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, if any of the foregoing conditions
was not timely performed, Defendants had an additional 180 days within which to make a
partial payment on the Judgment of $1,000,000.00, with the balance of the Judgment to
be paid twelve (12) months thereafter.

(R. 811.)

If neither the conditions nor the

payment was timely and fully performed, then, under the Settlement Agreement, Red
Bridge could begin collecting on the Judgment through any means permitted by law. (R.
811-12.) The Settlement Agreement further provided that if any legal action was taken to
enforce any term or provision of the Agreement, the prevailing party would be entitled to
payment of its attorneys' fees, expenses and costs incurred to enforce the Settlement
Agreement, including in any bankruptcy case, receivership proceeding or appeal. (R.
813.)
The Settlement Agreement also contained an integration clause:
This Agreement, and all documents identified as exhibits to
this Agreement, shall constitute the entire agreement and
understanding of and between the Parties in relation to
matters described herein, and no statements, representations,
inducements or promises other than as expressly set forth
herein have been given or received by any of the Parties (nor
by their respective agents, employees, attorneys or
representatives) in return for same. All negotiations, oral
conversations, statements, representation and/or agreements
leading up to the execution of this Agreement are merged
herewith and shall not be the basis for any legal rights, claims
or defenses in relation to any litigation or otherwise. No
parole or extrinsic evidence may be used to contradict any of
the terms of this Agreement. Any amendment to this
Agreement must be in writing, signed by duly authorized
representatives of the Parties hereto, and specifically state the
intent of the Parties to amend this Agreement.
(R. 813.)

6

Defendants have neither appealed from nor sought to set aside the Judgment that
was entered pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.

D.

Defendants Fail to Perform the Conditions Required by the
Settlement Agreement to Obtain Satisfaction of Judgment.

Defendants failed to perform all of the conditions required by the Settlement
Agreement to obtain a release of the Judgment in the following respects:
1.

The access and utility easements that Defendants granted to Red Bridge
were not "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances" by November 19,
2013, because a judgment lien affecting one of the Strip Parcels was neither
removed nor subordinated to Red Bridge's easements. (R. 1598, 2186.)
The judgment lien arose from a $39,000 judgment in favor of a company
called T&R Lumber Company against Elim Valley Planning &

~

Development, LLC, a non-party which owns a portion of the Strip Parcels. 3
(R. 1598, 2186.)
2.

As of November 19, 2013, the coijllilunication easement over the Strip
Parcels also had not been removed or subordinated in favor of Red Bridge.
(R. 1598, 2184-86.)

3.

No mutually acceptable development agreement was signed by the parties
and Defendants have not transferred title to the Strip Parcels to Red Bridge.
(kt)

Although it is not relevant to the appeal, Elim Valley is an affiliate of Defendants. (See,
~ R. 1529, 1722-46.) Defendants have never explained why they did not simply
satisfy the $39,000 judgment and obtain a release of the judgment lien - a fact that the
trial court also found puzzling. (Tr. 57:12-58:18, Defs' Add. 279-80.)
3

7

~

4.

Defendants did not pay Red Bridge $1,000,000 on or before May 23, 2014,
as required by Section 6(a) of the Settlement Agreement. (R. 811.)

On August 27, 2013, counsel for Red Bridge sent an email to Defendants' counsel
that stated, in part:
We have taken a look at the title issues in light of the
settlement, and have determined that several corrective
actions are required. Attached is a memo that explains the
actions that are required, with the documents that need to be
executed to correct some of the title defects.
(R. 1748.) The memorandum attached to counsel's email described the title exceptions
outlined in the title commitment dated May 17, 2013, and how they may affect Red
Bridge's access and utility easement over and through the Strip Parcels. (R. 1749.) The
memorandum does not reference exception number 20, the exception related to the
communications easement over the Strip Parcels. (R. 1751-52; Defs' Br. at 47.)
As a :r:esult of Defendants' failure to comply with the conditions set forth in the
Settlement Agreement, on May 27, 2014, Red Bridge began efforts to coll~ct on the
Judgment by applying for a post-judgment writ of execution, a charging order, and an
injunction to preserve assets. (See R. 1069-1160.)

E.

The District Court Denies Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of
Judgment.

Also on May 27, 2014, Defendants filed a "motion for satisfaction of judgment"
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B, in which they argued that the conditions
set forth in the Settlement Agreement under which the Judgment would be deemed
satisfied had been met. (R. 775-804.)

8

In their motion, Defendants asked the Court to order that the Judgment had been
satisfied because, according to Defendants, they had completed all the items under
Sections 4(a)-(c) of the Settlement Agreement (i.e., items 1-3 in part C, above) which
were required in order for the $2,000,000 Judgment to be released or deemed satisfied.

<iv

(See R. 780, 803.) Defendants made three arguments.
First, Defendants argued that Red Bridge failed to negotiate in "good faith" a
mutually acceptable development agreement, as required by Section 4(c) of the
Settlement Agreement because Red Bridge refused to accept the already existing Elim
Valley Development Agreement that governed the Properties and the Strip Parcels. (R.
786-95; Tr. 5:10-7:1, Defs' Add 227-29.) As a result, Defendants contend that they
either complied fully with the Settlement Agreement or should be excused from any
further performance. (R. 794-803.)
Second, Defendants argued that they should be excused from providing Red
Bridge with access and utility easements "free and clear of all liens and encumbrances"
because the parties had "mistakenly" included a small portion of land owned by a nonparty (Elim Valley Planning & Development, LLC) in the legal descriptions of the Strip
Parcels. (R. 780-81, 797-98; see also R. 2186-87.) According to Defendants, even
though the Strip Parcels remained encumbered by a judgment lien recorded against the
portion of the property owned by Elim Valley, the access and utility easement from
Mellon Valley to Red Bridge was free and clear of encumbrances, and this should suffice.
(R. 783.) Defendants contended that the mistaken inclusion of the Elim Valley property
was either a mutual mistake or an excusable unilateral mistake since the intent of the
9
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parties, again according to Defendants, was that only Defendant Mellon Valley was
agreeing to provide the access and utility easement free and clear of all encumbrances.
(See R. 797-98, 2122-23; Tr. 11:7-22, Defs' Add. 233.)
Third, Defendants argued (during oral argument, but not in the briefing they
submitted to the district court) that by virtue of an email from counsel dated August 27,
2013, Red Bridge waived its right to require the communication easement recorded
1i)

against the Strip Parcels be removed or subordinated. (Tr. 18:20-19:10, 50:5-54:17,
Defs'· Add. 240-41, 272-76.)
On July 3, 2014, the district court held a hearing on the parties' competing
motions. In advance of the hearing, the parties submitted a joint statement of stipulated
facts and a joint list of exhibits, virtually all of which were stipulated to be admissible.
(R. 2182-94.) Among the facts to which the parties stipulated was that the Settlement
Agreement was unambiguous and integrated, which Defendants agreed meant that the
district court should not "hear any parole evidence." (R. 2185; Tr. 15:23-16:7, Defs'
Add. 237-38.) At the beginning of the hearing, the court told the parties that it was
"particularly interested in what issues of fact remain open. I see both of these motions
basically as cross motions for summary judgment on the issues." (Tr. 5:6-9, Defs' Add.
227.) After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court observed that there were
questions of fact concerning whether there were good faith negotiations over a mutually
acceptable development agreement. (Tr. 47:9-23, Defs' Add. 269.) Counsel for Red
Bridge agreed and abandoned this argument for purposes of the proceedings. (Id.) The
district court then concluded that it would deny Defendants' motion, noting that the
10

motion was not "well taken on many fronts but clearly not sufficient [] either
substantively and maybe procedurally." (Tr. 59:13-18, Defs' Add. 281.) Thereafter, the
district court granted Red Bridge's request for an injunction and charging orders. (Tr.
67:4-7, Defs' Add. 289.) On July 11, 2014, the district court entered a series of orders
that denied Defendants' motion for satisfaction of judgment, issued an injunction to
preserve assets, and issued a charging order. 4 (R. 2214-24.)

F.

The District Court Grants Red Bridge's Motion for Attorneys'
Fees.

On July 21, 2014, Red Bridge filed a motion for award of attorney's fees and costs
pursuant to the Agreement and the Judgment. (R. 2256-301.) In support of its request,
Red Bridge submitted the affidavit of its attorney, David Leta, which set forth a
description of the time spent and work performed, including the hourly rate of the

\G.,

persons who performed the work, and stated that such rates were reasonable. (R. 226665.) Defendants opposed Red Bridge's request, arguing that the fees were unreasonable
because the tasks should have been performed in less time, the persons performing the
tasks should have been those who bill at a lower hourly rate, and that Mr. Leta's hourly
rate is too high. (R. 2373-77.) At the conclusion of a hearing on November 5, 2014, the
district court granted Red Bridge's motion for fees in the amounts requested. (R. 2437,
I

2640-42, 3892 (11/5/2014 Hearing Tr. 10:1-12:20).)

4

A Stipulated and Amended Charging Order was subsequently entered by the Court on
July 15, 2014. (R. 2239-40.)
11
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The parties settled their dispute over Red Bridge's deficiency action with an "all
or nothing" deal - Defendants would pay Red Bridge's $2 million Judgment, plus
interest, or Defendants would satisfy all of the conditions in the Settlement Agreement so
that Red Bridge could develop the Properties without interference from the Defendants or
their other creditors.

Defendants simply did not comply with all of the conditions

required by the Settlement Agreement to obtain a release of the Judgment. As a result,
Red Bridge began efforts to collect and enforce the Judgment, as it was entitled to do
under the Settlement Agreement, and it continues to do so today. Defendants do not
challenge the validity of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants have not sued Red
Bridge for breach of the Settlement Agreement, and Defendants reject any suggestion
that they are seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement. Defendants also have never
appealed from or sought to set aside the Judgment.
Instead, Defendants seek to have the district court's order denying their motion for
satisfaction of judgment reversed. In support of their request, Defendants advance a
number of arguments that focus on Defendants' compliance (or lack thereof) with the
terms of the Settlement Agreement. But, it is undisputed that Defendants never paid or
even tendered the full amount of the Judgment, plus interest, as required to obtain a
satisfaction of judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58B.

This is fatal to

Defendants' appeal and Defendants' arguments related to the district court's alleged
refusal to take evidence or Defendants' compliance with the Settlement Agreement are
irrelevant.
12

In any event, Defendants' appeal fails for multiple additional reasons:
First, as to the question of Defendants' compliance with the terms of the
Settlement Agreement, Defendants are effectively asking this Court to advise the parties
as to whether the Defendants fully performed their obligations under the document, or
whether they should be excused from such a performance. Utah Courts, however, lack
the power to decide abstract questions in the absence of an actual controversy. Should
the Court be unable to resolve the appeal under Rule 58B, the appeal should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
Second, contrary to Defendants' contention, the district court did not ''convert" the
parties' motions into cross-motions for summary judgment. There is no such procedure
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and, even if there was, a mere comment by the
district court that he saw the motions "basically as cross motions for summary judgment"
is simply that - a comment.

Defendants' arguments concerning the district court's

alleged conversion of the parties' motions are irrelevant and do not give rise to any
reversible error.
Third, the district court did not refuse to take evidence, as asserted by Defendants.
To the contrary, the district court reviewed the stipulated facts and exhibits submitted by
the parties. Even if the district court had refused to take evidence, however, Defendants
fail to explain why this was an error, how this alleged error changed the outcome of the

proceedings, or how they preserved the issue for appellate review. Defendants did not
make a proper objection at the trial court level, nor did they proffer the evidence they
now claim they would have submitted.
13

Finally. to the extent the Court concludes it is necessary to reach the merits of
Defendants' arguments, Defendants did not comply with the terms of the Settlement
Agreement and they should not be excused from performance by virtue of any mistake mutual or unilateral - by the doctrine of substantial compliance, or by waiver. The
Settlement Agreement was an all or nothing deal. In other words, Defendants needed to
check every box in the Settlement Agreement in order for Red Bridge to release the
Judgment. Defendants failed to do so and they do not contend otherwise. Defendants are
not entitled to have the Judgment released or deemed satisfied, and the district court's
order denying Defendants' motion for satisfaction of judgment should be affirmed.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.

A.

It is Undisputed that Defendants Did Not Satisfy the Judgment.

Defendants elected to seek relief pursuant to Rule 58B. Under Rule 58B, "[i]f a
judgment debtor offers a full satisfaction of the judgment, the judgment creditor must,
within 28 days, file an aclmowledgment of satisfaction in the court in which the judgment
was entered." Utah Res. Int'l, Inc. v. Mark Tech. Corp., 2014 UT 60, ,r 33, 342 P.3d 779
(quotations and alteration omitted). "If the judgment creditor fails to do so, the judgment
debtor may file a motion with the district court and, with satisfactory proof, the court may
enter an order declaring the judgment satisfied."

Id. (quotation omitted).

"The

'satisfactory proof necessary for the court to enter such an order may include proof of
acceptance of payment or, in the case where payment is refused, it may include proof that

14

the judgment debtor validly tendered payment." Id. A valid tender must be "(I) timely,
(2) made to the person entitled to payment, (3) unconditional, (4) an offer to pay the
amount of money due, and (5) coupled with an actual production of the money or its
equivalent." Id. at ,r 34 (quotation omitted).
Defendants have neither appealed from nor sought to set aside the Judgment. 5 By
its own terms, the Judgment obligated Defendants to pay $2,000,000 to Red Bridge, plus
interest on all unpaid portions of the Judgment at the rate of 15% per annum. (R. 74546.) Here, there is no dispute - or even assertion- that Defendants paid or tendered "the
full amount of the judgment," as required to obtain satisfaction of Judgment pursuant to
Rule 58B. Utah Res. Int'l, Inc., 2014 UT 60,

,r 40.

Defendants' arguments concerning

the terms of the Settlement Agreement (which is neither incorporated into nor referenced
in the Judgment) and their alleged compliance with those terms are, therefore, irrelevant.
The district court correctly denied Defendants' motion for satisfaction of judgment, and
the court's ruling should be affirmed by this Court. See id.

5

Red Bridge notes that Defendants have never cited to Rule 60(b) - in proceedings
below or before this Court - and it is now too late for Defendants to seek to set aside the
Judgment. See Utah Res. Int'l, Inc., 2014 UT 60, ,r 24 ("When a postjudgment motion
does not properly reference the appropriate rule, [Utah courts] have repudiated the
practice of rescuing such motions by construing them in accordance with [Utah's] rules
of procedure."); Workers Comp. Fund v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 2011 UT 61, ,r,r 13-14, 266
P.3d 792 ("It should be Argonaut's burden, not the burden of the district court or
opposing counsel, to identify the rule under which it seeks relief from judgment.
Therefore, as with rule 59 motions, the form of a rule 60(b) motion does matter and
attorneys requesting relief under rule 60(b) should notify the court that they are seeking
relief under that rule."); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (motion under Rule 60(b)(5) must be
"made within a reasonable time").
15
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B.

Defendants' Performance Under the Settlement Agreement
Presents a Non-Justiciable Question.

Should this Court conclude that Defendants' arguments regarding the terms of the
Settlement Agreement or their compliance therewith may be relevant to the district
court's denial of Defendants' motion for satisfaction of judgment, Defendants' appeal
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Defendants disclaim any characterization of
their motion below as one to "enforce the Settlement Agreement." (Defs' Br. at 48.) If,
however, Defendants were not seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement or to set
aside the Judgment, and no claims for declaratory relief (or anything else) were pending
between the parties, Defendants' request can be nothing other than an effort to have the
district court (and now this Court) advise the parties as to whether Defendants have
performed their obligations under the Settlement Agreement or whether they should be
excused from such performance. (See id.) But, "even courts of general jurisdiction have
no power to decide abstract questions or to render declaratory judgments, in the absence
of an actual controversy directly involving-rights."

Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of

Amalgamated Transit Union, 2012 UT 75, 1 19, 289 P.3d 582 (quotation, emphasis, and
alteration omitted).

In other words, "courts are not a forum for hearing academic

contentions or rendering advisory opinions."

Id. (quotation omitted).

Defendants'

attempt to seek such an advisory opinion should be rejected and this appeal dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. at 11 25-27 ("Mootness is a constitutional principle, not
a matter left to our discretion to decide which cases should be spun out and which cut off
based on some vague sense of fairness or importance of the issue."); Fundamentalist
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Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg. 2010 UT 51, ,I 40, 238 P.3d
I 054 ("A dispute is ripe when a conflict over the application of a legal provision has
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations between the
parties thereto. An issue is not ripe for appeal if there exists no more than a difference of
opinion regarding the hypothetical application of a provision to a situation in which the
parties might, at some future time, find themselves." (quotation and emphases omitted)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err By "Converting the Pending
Motions ... Into Cross Motions for Summary Judgment."

Even if the Court considers the substance of Defendants' arguments on appeal,
Defendants' primary argument - that the district court erred in "converting" the parties'
motions "into cross motions for summary judgment" and then "summarily" deciding the
issues without taking evidence - fails for at least four reasons. (See Defs' Br. at 28.)
First, the district court did not "convert" the parties' motions into "cross motions
for summary judgment" because there is no such procedure. Rule l 2(b) provides:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by
Rule 56.
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b) (emphasis added). The Rules of Civil Procedure do not address or
even contemplate a situation in which a motion other than one to dismiss under Rule
l 2(b)(6) can be "converted" to or "treated" as one for summary judgment. Cf. Spoons v.
Lewis, 1999 UT 82, ,JiJ 4-5, 987 P.2d 36 ("The purpose of this provision is to allow
17

parties an adequate opportunity to rebut materials outside the pleadings .... Rule 12,
however, does not convert motions based on subsections (b)(l) through (5) (which are
raised as part of the initial responsive pleadings) into motions for summary judgment
simply because they include some affirmative evidence relating to the basis for the
motion."). Defendants cite to no authority to the contrary because there is none.
Even if it was possible to "convert" the parties' motions - for satisfaction of
judgment and for charging orders - into a motion for summary judgment, the trial court
did nothing of the sort. The only thing the trial court did was to comment - at the very
beginning of the hearing - that the court was "particularly interested in what issues of
fact remain open. I see both of these motions basically as cross motions for summary
judgment on the issues." (Tr. 5:6-9, Defs' Add. 227.)6
Second, it is demonstrably untrue that the district court refused to take evidence.
The parties submitted a joint statement of stipulated facts and exhibits in advance of the
hearing (R. 2182-94), to which both parties made reference during the course of the
hearing. (See, e.g.• Tr. 50:2-56:2, Defs' Add. 274-78.) Indeed, the district court's order
- approved as to form by counsel to Defendants - made clear that the court's decision
was based on "the Stipulated Facts filed by the parties on June 30, 2014, the Joint List of
Exhibits, also filed by the parties on June 30, 2014, and the arguments of counsel." (R.

2214-15 (emphasis added).)

6

For the same reasons, it was not error - as Defendants argue - for the trial court not to
"issue a written ruling detailing the grounds for its decision" under Rule 52. (See Defs'
Br. at 30.)
18

Third, any such error is harmless because the district court could and did decide
the issue as a matter of law. This is because the parties stipulated that the Settlement
Agreement was unambiguous and integrated and they agreed that the court should not
consider parol evidence. (R. 2185; Tr. 16:5-20, Defs' Add. 238.) As a result, it is
unclear what additional evidence the district court could or should have considered, and
none was proffered. See, e.g., The Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 321, ,r
10, 142 P.3d 140 (parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or supplement a
completely integrated agreement). Indeed, Defendants never even identify to this Court
exactly what evidence they believe the district court should have considered, or how this
would have changed the outcome. (See, e.g., Defs' Br. at 29-30.) Defendants merely
assert - in conclusory fashion - that the questions of mutual or unilateral mistake of fact
and waiver require the court to receive unspecified "evidence." (Defs' Br. at 31-32.)
But, where, as here, it is undisputed that ( 1) the unambiguous terms of the Settlement
Agreement define the Strip Parcels by reference to the legal descriptions attached as
Exhibit B to the Settlement Agreement, which indisputably included property owned by
Elim Valley and (2) a judgment lien remains on the portion of the Strip Parcels owned by
Elim Valley, the district court could conclude, as a matter of law, that Defendants did not
provide the access and utility easement "free and clear of all encumbrances" as required
by the Settlement Agreement. It was, therefore, unnecessary for the district court to
consider any extrinsic evidence. To the extent it was error for the district court not to
consider any unspecified evidence, the error was necessarily harmless and Defendants
nowhere even assert otherwise. See, e.g., Covey v. Covey. 2003 UT App 380, ,r 21, 80
19

P.3d 553 ("Harmless error is defined ... as an error that is sufficiently inconsequential
that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings .... On appeal, the appellant has the burden of demonstrating an error was
prejudicial - that there is a reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of
the proceedings." (quotations and citations omitted)).
Finally, to the extent it could be considered an error not to take additional
...)

evidence or hold an "evidentiary hearing," as Defendants assert, and to the extent such
error was not harmless, Defendants did not preserve this issue for appellate review
because they failed to make any such objection to the trial court or proffer the evidence
Defendants would have submitted. 7 See Clark Props., Inc. v. JDW-CM, LLC, 2012 UT
App 163, ,r,r 7-8, 282 P.3d 1009 (rejecting claim that the trial court improperly failed to
conduct a hearing where the plaintiff's attorney did not object to the court's procedure or
attempt to put on or even proffer any evidence); see also State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,
445 (Utah 1996) ("This court has previously noted that we will not set aside a verdict
because of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of evidence appears of
record, and we believe that the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict." (quotation omitted)).
For at least the foregoing reasons, the Court must reject Defendants' arguments
concerning any purported procedural or evidentiary errors by the trial court.
The most Defendants said to the trial court on this point amounted to a few vague
references to unspecified evidence. Defendants' counsel told the district court, for
example, that "the evidence will show that the defendants submitted to the plaintiff a
proposed development agreement." (Tr. 5:18-19, Defs' Add. 227.) Counsel for
Defendants never identified the nature of the evidence to which he was referring.
7

20

D.

Defendants Did Not Comply with the Requirements of the
Settlement Agreement.

If the Court determines that it is necessary to reach this issue, the Court must

conclude that Defendants did not fully perform their obligations under the Settlement
Agreement and, therefore, the district court did not err in denying Defendants' Rule 58B
motion. Notably, Defendants have never argued that the Settlement Agreement is not
valid or enforceable. Nor have Defendants argued that Red Bridge has breached the
Settlement Agreement. As noted above, Defendants also disclaim seeking to enforce the
Settlement Agreement. Compare, e.g., Foster v. Montgomery. 2003 UT App 405, ,r 24,
82 P.3d 191 ("settlement agreements constitute an executory accord which allows the
party alleging breach thereof the option of seeking enforcement of the settlement
agreement or of rescinding that settlement agreement and pursuing the underlying
claim"). Instead, Defendants argue that the district court erred by not ''declar[ing]" that
Defendants had complied with or should be excused from compliance with the conditions
in the Settlement Agreement necessary to obligate Red Bridge to deem the Judgment
satisfied.

(See Defs' Br. at 48.)

Assuming this presents a justiciable question,

Defendants' arguments fail as a matter of law.
Both parties stipulated that "[t]he. Settlement Agreement is unambiguous and
integrated." (R. 2185.) "Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to
general contract actions." Sacl<ler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995). Contract
interpretation "begins and ends with the language of the contract." Daines v. Vincent,
2008 UT 51

,r

30, 190 P.3d 1269. When, as here, "the language of the contract is
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unambiguous, the intention of the parties may be determined as a matter of law based on
the language of the agreement." 8 Peterson v. The Sunrider Corp .. 2002 UT 43, ,r 18, 48
P.3d 918.
1.

The district court did not err by rejecting Defendants' claim
of mutual mistake.

There is no dispute that a $39,000 judgment lien remains on a portion of the Strip
Parcels. (See Defs' Br. at 38; see also R. 2186-87.) Defendants, however, contend that
the Settlement Agreement's definition of "Strip Parcels" should be read to include only
the property owned by Defendant Mellon. (See, e.g., Defs' Br. at 40.) According to
Defendants, the inclusion of property owned by Elim Valley in the legal description of
the Strip Parcels was a mutual mistake of fact (or negligible) and the contract should be
reformed. (Defs' Br. at 40-41.) "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time
of contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which
they based their bargain." The Cantamar. LLC, 2006 UT App 321,

,r 38

(quotation

omitted). Notably, "[t]he proponent of reformation has the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence that there was a mutual mistake of fact." Vandermeide v.
Young. 2013 UT App 31, ,r 12,296 P.3d 787 (quotation omitted).
Defendants do not claim that they did or could satisfy their evidentiary burden.
Defendants claim that the district court erred by not allowing Defendants to put on
evidence of the parties' mutual mistake, i.e., evidence of the parties' intent. (Defs' Br. at

8

Further, as discussed above, Defendants conceded that the district court should not
consider any parol evidence. (Tr. 16:4-7, Defs' Add. 238.) Defendants cannot now
claim it was error for the district court not to consider any such evidence.
22

42-43.) But, Defendants did not offer any evidence to the trial court, they still have not
identified what evidence they would have submitted to the trial court, and they never
brought an action seeking to reform the Settlement Agreement because of an alleged
mutual mistake. This is because there is no evidence of a "mutual" mistake. 9 At the
hearing on the parties' motions, Defendants could only argue that the alleged "mutual
mistake" was evident from the language of the contract itself.1° (See, e.g., Tr. 7:12-8:11,
16:17-17:1 ("this is a mistake, within the four comers"), Defs' Add. 229-30, 238-39; see
also R. 2123 ("This intent can be derived from within the four comers of the Settlement
Agreement.").) In short, it is not true that the district court refused to consider evidence
offered by the Defendants. Defendants have never offered any evidence - to the trial
court or this Court - that both parties were mistaken as to whether the Strip Parcels

9

Indeed, in Defendants' briefing before the district court, they did not even argue a
"mutual mistake of fact," only that the "legal descriptions attached to the Settlement were
in error" and the portion owned by Elim Valley "is negligible and does not materially
impact the rights of Red Bridge." (R. 798, 2122-23.)
10 Red Bridge disagrees with Defendants' assertion that any sort of mistake is evidence
from the language of the Settlement Agreement. The fact that the Strip Parcels include
more than just the property in a particular location (i.e., between the Properties and Sand
Hollow Road) that is owned by Defendant Mellon does not conflict at all with the
language of paragraph D of the Settlement that the Strip Parcels "constitute[] all of the
property that Mellon owns between the Properties and Sand Hollow Road." (R. 808,
819-22.) In other words, the language of the Settlement Agreement can and should be
read simply to reflect the fact that Defendant Mellon was subjecting all of the property it
owned between the Properties and Sand Hollow Road to the requirements of the
Settlement Agreement, while Defendants were simultaneously accepting contractual
obligations with respect to the entire area (i.e., the Strip Parcels, as defined in the legal
description). There is no conflict. See, e.g .. Nolin v. S & S Constr., Inc., 2013 UT App
94, ,I 13, 301 P.3d 1026 ("When interpreting the plain language, we look for a reading
that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless."
(quotation and alteration omitted)).
23
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encompassed property owned by Elim Valley. 11 Defendants' argument that the trial court
erred by rejecting their claim that the terms of the Settlement Agreement should be
modified because of some alleged "mutual mistake" must be rejected. See Peterson v.
Coca-Cola USA, 2002 UT 42,

~

20, 48 P.3d 941 (holding that the claim of mutual

mistake failed because the proponent did not provide evidence of the intent of the other
party to the release and that party's insurance carrier); Vandermeide, 2013 UT App 31, 1
14 (appellate court "will not disturb a finding unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made" (quotation omitted)).
2.

The district court did not err by rejecting Defendants' claim
of unilateral mistake.

Defendants' argument that the district court erred by not allowing evidence of a
unilateral mistake fails for substantially the same reasons that their arguments about
mutual mistake lack merit.

(Defs' Br. at 43-44.)

Defendants fail to identify what

evidence they would have submitted to the district court or how this would have changed

So there is no question, Red Bridge states unequivocally that the inclusion of the Elim
Valley property in the legal description of the Strip Parcels was not a mistake at all certainly not a mistake on the part of Red Bridge. To the contrary, Red Bridge wanted
the southern border of its eastern parcel to run perpendicular to Sand Hollow road in
order to ensure maximum flexibility in developing the Properties and locating the access
easement. As a result, Red Bridge intended for the portion of the Strip Parcels owned by
Elim Valley to be included within the description of Strip Parcel as shown on the map
which was attached to the Settlement Agreement. From Red Bridge's perspective, the
location of the Strip Parcel, and, therefore, the potential future location of the access
easement, was a material aspect of the Settlement Agreement. (See, e.g., Tr. 28:5-30:10,
Defs' Add. 250-52.)
11
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the outcome.1 2

(Id.)

In fact, counsel for Defendants told the district court that

Defendants "tried" to comply and get the judgment lien removed from the portion of the
Strip Parcels owned by Elim Valley, which directly contradicts Defendants' claim that
any mistake was made - unilateral or otherwise. (Tr. 15:1-8, Defs' Add. 237.) In any

'-

event, the relief Defendants appear to be seeking is rescission of the contract (Defs' Br. at
44), which is directly contrary to their request to the district court (and now to this Court)
- seeking a determination that Defendants' complied with the Settlement Agreement and
order the Judgment satisfied. Defendants never filed an action to rescind the Settlement
Agreement, and no such claim was before the district court. Moreover, if the Settlement
Agreement were to be rescinded, then Defendants' request for the district court to deem
the Judgment satisfied would have no basis and Defendants would need to seek to have
the Judgment set aside, which they have not sought, let alone accomplished. Regardless,
Defendants point to no evidence whatsoever that would entitle them to rescission or any
other relief based on an alleged unilateral mistake. (See Defs' Br. at 44 (citing the
elements, but no evidence).)

Red Bridge submits that Defendants' briefmg on this point (and others) - which
consists of two pages of law without any analysis as to how the law applies to the facts of
this case or how the district court erred - is wholly inadequate for this Court to even
properly evaluate Defendants' argument, such as it is, and Defendants' arguments should
be rejected for that reason alone. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ,r 9, 194 P.3d 903
(appellant's brief is inadequate "if it merely contains bald citations to authority [without]
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority" (alteration
in original; quotation omitted)); Jacob v. Cross, 2012 UT App 190, ,r 2,283 P.3d 539 (per
curiam) ("If an appellant fails to adequately brief an issue on appeal, the appellate court
may decline to consider the argument.").
12
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3.

The district court did not err by rejecting Defendants' plea of
substantial compliance.

Defendants' contention that the district court should have declared that they had
substantially performed the requirements of the Settlement Agreement is simply a nonsequitur. (Defs' Br. at 38-9.) The doctrine of "substantial compliance" is a defense to a
breach of contract claim (which Red Bridge has never asserted) when the defaulting party
claims it will suffer substantial forfeiture if its breach is not excused. The doctrine can
have no application where, as here, the Settlement Agreement expressly contemplates the
possibility that Defendants might not perform all of the conditions stated in the
-iJ

document.

In such an event, as occurred here, the Settlement Agreement expressly

provides that Red Bridge would be permitted to execute on the Judgment - which is
exactly what happened.

In other words, the parties anticipated that all of the

requirements set forth in the Settlement Agreement might not be accomplished.
Excusing Defendants from the consequences of their failure to perform deprives Red
Bridge of the very benefit for which it bargained - an all or nothing agreement. (See R.
1505-06.)
_.,

In any event, Defendants utterly fail to explain how they satisfy the

requirements for the doctrine to apply or how the district court allegedly erred on this
point; they merely conclude that the $39,000 judgment lien remaining on the Strip
Parcels "was not material to Defendants' entire performance under the agreement." 13
(Defs' Br. at 38.) This is insufficient.

13

Notably, this assertion is directly contrary to Defendants' argument that the Settlement
Agreement should be rescinded based on Defendants' alleged unilateral mistake which
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4.

The district court did not err in rejecting Defendants' waiver
argument.

Defendants contend that because Red Bridge did not identify exception number 20
(the exception related to the blanket communications easement over the Strip Parcels) in
the memorandum attached to an August 27, 2013 email from Red Bridge's counsel (R.
1751-52), Red Bridge "distinctly and expressly waived and relinquished any right ... to
demand" that the communications easement over the Strip Parcels be removed or
subordinated. 14 (Defs' Br. at 47.) Defendants' argument fails for at least three reasons.
First, the email in question from Red Bridge's counsel was intended to assist
Defendants in "correct[ing] some of the title defects." (R. 1748 (emphasis added).) This
email is not, as a matter of law, a "distinct" and "intentional relinquishment of a known
right," as is required to show waiver. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n,

"

857 P.2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993) (quotation omitted). Waiver should not "be found from
any particular set of facts unless it was clearly intended." Id. at 940 (emphasis added).
This is particularly true when, as here, the waiver claimed by Defendants is implied, not
express. Utah law is clear that "mere silence is not a waiver unless there is some duty or
obligation to speak." Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 72-73 (Utah 1998) (quotation
and alteration omitted). "It is generally accepted that a duty to speak will not be found
where the contracting parties deal at arm's length, and where the underlying facts are

requires that the alleged mistake relate "to a material feature of the contract." (Defs' Br.
at 41, 44.) Defendants cannot have it both ways.
14 As noted above, this argument was not made in Defendants' moving papers to the trial
court, but was argued at the hearing on Defendants' motion. (R. 775-803, 2121-26; Tr.
50:2-54:17, Defs' Add. 272-76.)
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reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff
is obliged to take reasonable steps to inform himself, and to protect his own interests."
Id. (quotation and emphasis omitted). In other words, Red Bridge's failure to expressly
inform Defendants of their obligation to remove or subordinate the communications
easement cannot, as a matter oflaw, amount to an implied waiver.
Second, Defendants' waiver argument cannot overcome the anti-waiver provision
in Section 21 of the Settlement Agreement which provides that "no waiver of any such
right hereunder shall be binding unless reduced to writing and signed by the party to be
charged therewith." (R. 814.) There is no question that Red Bridge - the party to be
charged with waiver - did not document, let alone sign any waiver, which confirms that it
did not intend (clearly or otherwise) to waive anything at all. See, e.g., Living Scriptures,
1..J

Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("This nonwaiver clause provides
additional evidence that LSI did not intend to waive its right to strict performance under
the lease.").
Finally, even if Red Bridge waived its right to require that the communications
easement. be removed or subordinated, the judgment lien indisputably continues to

i~

encumber the Strip Parcels. Therefore, Defendants have failed to comply with all their
obligations under the Settlement Agreement, and Red Bridge is entitled to collect on and
~

enforce the Judgment. The district court did not err when it denied Defendant's Rule 58B
motion for satisfaction of judgment.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ATTORNEYS'
FEES TO RED BRIDGE.

Defendants assert that the district court erred in awarding Red Bridge its attorneys'
fees because "this was not an action to enforce the Settlement Agreement." 15 (Defs' Br.
at 47.) Notably, Defendants made no such argument to the trial court. 16 (R. 2373-77.)
Instead, Defendants argued only that the fees requested were unreasonable. (R. 2375-76.)
"Preservation requires affording the district court a meaningful opportunity to rule on the
ground that is advanced on appeal, and that implies, at a minimum, not just the invocation
of a legal principle but also its application to the facts of the case." Hill v. Superior Prop.
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2013 UT 60, ,r 46,321 P.3d 1054; see also 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat.
Inc., 2004 UT 72,

,r 51, 99 P.3d 801

(to be preserved, an issue must be (1) "raised in a

timely fashion," (2) be "specifically raised," and (3) the "challenging party must
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority" (quotations omitted)).

15

Red Bridge notes that the Settlement Agreement does not limit the prevailing party's
right to recover attorneys' fees to only those fees that are reasonable. Instead, it provides
that "if any legal action is taken to enforce any term or provision of [the] Agreement, the
parties agree that the prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to payment of its
attorneys' fees, expenses and costs incurred to enforce the terms of this Agreement." (R.
812-13.)
16 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(b)(5) requires a party to cite to the record
"showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court" or state the "grounds for seeking
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." In their brief, however, Defendants
indicate they preserved all their various issues on appeal by merely citing to four pages in
the record: 775, 2373, 3891, and 3892, each of which is only the first page of a brief or
the first page of the transcript from the relevant hearing. (See Defs' Br. at 1-5.) Even if
this is sufficient as a general matter, with respect to Defendants' appeal of the Red
Bridge's award of attorneys' fees, Defendants never argued- in their briefing or at oral
argument - that Red Bridge is not entitled to its fees because Defendants were not
seeking to enforce the Settlement Agreement. (See, e.g .• R. 2373-77; R. 3892 (11/5/2014
Hearing Tr. at 3:9-4:2).)
29
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Defendants' argument that the district court should not have awarded Red Bridge its
attorneys' fees because Defendants were allegedly not seeking to enforce the Settlement
Agreement was, therefore, not preserved for appellate review and should not be
considered by this Court. Even if Defendants were not seeking to enforce the Settlement
Agreement, Red Bridge also based its fee request on the Judgment, which entitles Red
Bridge to an award of its "reasonable costs, expenses and attorneys' fees" incurred in
"collecting or enforcing this Judgment." (R. 746, 2256-57.)
In any event, the fees sought by Red Bridge were reasonable and the district court
did not abuse its discretion in so holding. The party requesting a fee award carries its
initial burden by presenting evidence, by affidavit, of the hours spent, the hourly rates
charged, and the usual and customary rates for such work. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine,
830 P .2d 266, 269 (Utah 1992). Red Bridge did so (R. 2264-91) and Defendants were,
therefore, required to offer some evidence to rebut the initial showing made by Red
Bridge. See Salmon v. Davis Cnty., 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). Defendants failed
to do so, which is fatal to Defendants' argument on appeal.
Regardless, contrary to Defendants' argument, Red Bridge's counsel's hourly rate
was not excessive nor was Red Bridge's counsel inefficient.

(Defs' Br. at 49.) In

determining reasonableness, courts consider the following factors: (1) "What legal work
was actually performed?"; (2) "How much of the work performed was reasonably
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?"; (3) "Is the attorney's billing rate
consistent with the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar services?"; (4) and
(5) "Are there circumstances which require consideration of additional factors, including
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those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?" Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985,990 (Utah 1988).
Red Bridge's counsel's affidavit submitted in support of its request for attorneys'
fees stated that he was a licensed attorney and a partner with the law firm of Snell &
Wilmer; that the hourly rates charged are the same that had been billed to Red Bridge
throughout the case; that the time reflected on the invoices was actually expended for the
tasks that were performed and billed to Red Bridge; that the hourly rates "are
commensurate with [the timekeepers'] education and experience, and are comparable to
hourly rates charged by like professionals performing like services at regional law firms

~

with offices in Salt Lake City"; and that, based on the facts and issues of the case, the
fees requested are "fair and reasonable."

(R. 2264-65.)

The affidavit included an

attachment showing the hours billed, a description of the services performed, the hourly
rates for all of the timekeepers who worked on the matter, and the resumes of the various
timekeepers. (R. 2269-2301.)
In granting Red Bridge's request, the district court "considered the factors set forth
in [] Dixie State Bank" and "tried to apply ... those factors to the extent they are
relevant."

(R. 3892 (11/5/2014 Hearing Tr. 10:1-5).)

The court explained that

Defendants' argument that Red Bridge's counsel's rate was too high was a "difficult"
one, given "Mr. Leta has already provided in ... his affidavit ... that there are other
firms in town with lawyers of . . . comparable . . . background and skill, and that those
lawyers are charging rates that are either the same or not that much different." (Id. at
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11:1-9.)
...i)

.J

..;J
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The court properly concluded that "while it may be understandable that"

Defendants "react to numbers that are higher than what they're charging,"
it . . . require[ s] . . . a better showing than you have. And I
don't think you have that here. I don't think you could have
it, frankly, here, given what I have seen already as a judge in
the community. But putting that aside and basing it on Mr.
Leta's affidavit, I think it supports what is claim is .... So I'm
going to overrule the objection and grant the motion.
I'm also taking into account, as I said, these issues set forth in
the Dixie State Bank case, and particularly the complexity of
this matter, the skill and training required, the different skills
that were involved, and of course the time spent, and the
outcome in this case. So taking into account . . . all of those
factors, and particularly the ones that I mentioned, along with
the Dixie State Bank matters, I will grant the motion for
fees ....
(Id. at 11:10-12:20.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the reasonableness of
Red Bridge's claimed fees based on the information provided by Red Bridge.

See

Madsen v. Sadleir, 2008 l!T App 316, 2008 WL 3975626, at *1 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 28,
2008) (unpublished) (affirming award of fees as reasonable based on the same
information); see also Strohm v. ClearOne Commc'ns, Inc., 2013 UT 21, ,r 57, 308 P.3d
424 ("In determining reasonable attorney rates, the district court examined the experience
and skill level of Strohm' s attorneys, identified comparably skilled and experienced
...Yi)

attorneys in the Salt Lake City market, and used rates charged by the latter as a reference
to set reasonable rates for the former. We find nothing unreasonable about this approach.
Indeed, our caselaw recommends just such an inquiry.").
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III.

RED BRIDGE IS ENTITLED TO ITS FEES INCURRED IN
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.

By virtue of the Settlement Agreement and the Judgment, Red Bridge is entitled
and hereby requests an award of its fees incurred in defending against this appeal. As
noted above, the Settlement Agreement provides "that if any legal action is taken to
enforce any term or provision of this Agreement, the Parties agree that the prevailing
party in such action shall be entitled to payment of its attorneys' fees, expenses and costs
incurred to enforce the terms of this agreement, including ... appeal." (R. 812-13.)
Similarly, the Judgment provides that it "may be augmented by the reasonable costs,
expenses and attorneys' fees, incurred by Red Bridge in collecting or enforcing this
Judgment." (R. 746.) As a consequence, should Red Bridge prevail, it should also be
awarded its fees. See, e.g., Foster, 2003 UT App 405,

,r 27

("Because Montgomery

prevailed below, and now prevails on appeal, he is entitled to attorney fees and costs
pursuant to the Agreement.").
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CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth herein, Red Bridge requests that the Court affirm
the decision of the district court in its entirety and award Red Bridge its attorneys' fees,
expenses and costs incurred defending this appeal.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015.
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P.

~A&=
David E. Leta
Amber M. Mettler
Andrew V. Hardenbrook
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
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